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Se intentan medir los beneficios y costes fiscales de la relación entre 
las colonias americanas y España en el período de 1760 a 1814 a partir de 
una serie de nuevas estimaciones de los montos anuales de las remesas 
fiscales americanas. Se discuten los varios componentes de los beneficios 
fiscales que recibía la tesorería metropolitana, incluyendo las 
transferencias en metálico y en especie (tabaco de Cuba). Se argumenta 
que la contribución americana a los ingresos ordinarios metropolitanos 
aumentó en términos absolutos y relativos entre 1790 y 1810.  





1.   INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the analysis of the costs of colonialism in the Spanish 
empire has again attracted the attention of historians and especially of 
those who work on eighteenth century Mexico. An intense debate has 
ensued, but it should be noted that in two of the best-known studies of this 
area – those of John Coatsworth and Enrique Cárdenas - the definition of 
fiscal costs lacks accuracy, especially regarding the extraction of capital 
from Mexico through fiscal mechanisms. More specifically, the fact that a 
detailed and disaggregated study of the accounts of the royal treasury was 
not carried out by these authors -especially of the transfers of funds 
between the American colonies and remittances to the general treasury in 
Spain-, reduces the reliability of their conclusions.1 
The attempt to measure or evaluate the benefits and costs of 
colonialism within an administrative apparatus as huge as that of the 
Spanish imperial state at the end of the 18th century is, in effect, a 
difficult and complex exercise but it is especially important in order to 
analyze and evaluate the essential aspects of the link between colonies 
and metropolis. The fundamental argument that we put forward in this 
essay is that, for methodological reasons, the starting point when 
approaching this question should be a detailed analysis of the fiscal costs 
and benefits, before moving on to a study of the broader and more 
complex issue of the economic consequences and costs of the colonial 
relationship, a matter which, as yet, is far from being resolved. Therefore, 
                                                          
1 Coatsworth (1990), pp. 80-109, and Cárdenas (1985). Note that Coatsworth cites Humboldt 
as a source of fiscal information. For the series of remittances from New Spain to both the rest 
of America and Spain during the 18th century, see Marichal and Souto (1994). 
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in this paper we focus specifically on the imperial fiscal contributions of 
the American fiscal branches to the general treasury in Spain.  
In fact, this approach is not new; more than two centuries ago an 
observer as lucid and well-informed as Adam Smith -writing from his 
office in Scotland- suggested that one of the most important elements to 
assess the benefits and costs of colonialism was the analysis of the 
remittances of precious metals to the royal treasury.2 In the Spanish 
American case, these funds were mainly used to cover the military and 
naval administrative expenses of both the metropolis and the empire, 
although -as we know today- they also played a vital part in servicing of 
the debts of the Spanish government during the reigns of Carlos III and 
Carlos IV.3 
This essay provides new data on the evolution of the finance of the 
Spanish empire and, in particular, on the colonial fiscal contributions to 
the metropolis in the half century from 1760 to 1814. Specifically, we 
present a series of new estimates of the annual amounts of American 
fiscal remittances, highlighting their weight as a percentage of the total 
ordinary income of the general treasury of the Spanish government. The 
information and analysis that we present on this subject contributes, 
therefore, not only to the debate on New Spanish finances, but also to the 
recent wide-ranging and lively discussion of the financial crisis of the 
Spanish monarchy in which Josep Fontana, Jacques Barbier, Javier 
Cuenca, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, Pedro Pérez Herrero, Richard 
Garner and Herbert Klein, among other researchers, have participated.4 
Our analysis is based in part on the important series of income and 
expenses of the general treasury of Spain published by José Patricio 
Merino for the years 1760-1820.5 We have also made critical comparisons 
with the data on colonial remittances included in the huge compilation 
published by Klein and TePaske on the income and expenses of Spanish 
American treasuries in the 18th century.6 The two series are very similar 
until around the end of the 18th century, but from the mid-1790s. 
However, for the years 1805-1812, it was also necessary to explore 
additional sources of tax information found in the historical archives in 
                                                          
2 Apart from Smith, it is also worth revisiting Humboldt's comments on the costs of 
colonialism in his Political Essay (1811, re-edited in 1991). 
3 See Marichal (1989 and 1990) and Tedde (1989). 
4 Fontana (1981 and 1986), Barbier (1980 a and b), Cuenca (1982), Prados de la Escosura 
(1989), chap. 2, and (1993), iii, 2, Pérez Herrero (1991), Garner (1993), chap. 7, and Klein 
(1995), chap. 6. 
5 Merino (1987). 
6 Klein and TePaske (1987-1989) and Klein (1995). 
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order to obtain reliable fiscal and financial data for both the colonial and 
metropolitan cases.7 
An initial finding of this study shows that the American contribution 
to the metropolitan tax revenue increased in absolute and relative terms 
towards the end of the colonial regime, and especially between 1790 and 
1810. This increasing trend in remittances has not been highlighted in 
previous studies for several reasons, the first being that the calculation of 
the weight of American fiscal remittances is not usually evaluated as a 
percentage of the ordinary income of the royal metropolitan treasury.8 
Indeed, our argument is that the item "Indias" represented a net fiscal 
transfer from the American treasuries to that of the metropolis, just like 
any other tax. These contributions from overseas were not converted into 
debts and therefore a distortion is introduced if they are included in the 
calculation of the extraordinary income of the metropolitan treasury, 
especially after 1790, when the Crown’s debt levels shot up, both in the 
short and the long term. 
Our analysis shows that the colonies provided, as an annual average, 
slightly below 15% of the ordinary income of the metropolitan general 
treasury between 1763 and 1783, but that this contribution later increased 
substantially in absolute and relative terms. Indeed, our analysis of 
American contributions indicates that they represented more than 25% of 
the ordinary income of the general treasury during most of the 1790s, 
40% in the years 1802-1804, and nearly 50% in the critical years of 1808-
1811. This increasing trend can be seen clearly in the attached statistical 
tables. 
Secondly, this essay argues that a more detailed investigation of the 
components of ordinary income derived from the colonial relationship is 
required. These were made up of three groups. The first and most 
important consisted of remittances in cash from the American treasuries 
(at the time referred to as “remissibles” (remisibles), but also coming 
under the heading of Indias in the accounts of the royal metropolitan 
treasury). These came from certain taxes and income collected in cash by 
the American authorities and were systematically sent to Spain. (For 
annual sums, see Table 1.)  
                                                          
7 It is particularly difficult to specify remittance information for the years 1805-1811, a period 
for which neither Merino nor Klein and TePaske had accurate estimates. For this reason, we 
have resorted to Canga Argüdles (1833-34 and 1835), Alcalá Galiano (1810), Toreno (1835) 
and other sources mentioned in this essay. A more detailed analysis of these series is carried 
out by Marichal (1998, published in the press). 
8 Our definition of the general treasury’s "ordinary income" includes the total amount of the 
taxes and income from state monopolies (estancos) collected in the Spanish peninsula, 
including the American remittances that reached the metropolis. 
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The second item consisted of taxes collected in Spain on imports and 
exports, general income; the American component here was estimated by 
Prados de la Escosura. These taxes were not included in the "General 
Depositary of the Indias" after 1783, so we offer a new estimate.9 
The third item (which has not been considered or analyzed by Prados 
de la Escosura or other researchers) is the percentage of the income of the 
tobacco monopoly (estanco) in Spain that came from shipments of raw 
tobacco from the state tobacco monopoly in Cuba. These large shipments 
of raw material (which the tobacco monopoly in Spain received free of 
cost) represented a relatively important proportion of the final value of the 
tobacco sold by the tobacco company in the peninsula and, therefore, can 
be considered as a tax contribution in kind received by the metropolis 
from America. Obviously, if this argument is accepted, an increase in the 
estimate of the fiscal benefits that the metropolis received from its 
American colonies is required. (See Table 2.) 
To complement these estimates of the total amount of American 
remittances, we offer an evaluation of the specific contribution of the 
Viceroyalty of New Spain to the income of the Crown, demonstrating its 
growing importance for the metropolitan treasury but also for the support 
of the Spanish empire in the whole of northern America and in the greater 
Caribbean. This may help to explain why Spain - despite having less 
military and financial muscle than Britain or France in the late 18th 
century - was able to retain its American colonies for longer than its 
rivals. 
The last section of this essay focuses on an analysis of American fiscal 
remittances between 1804 and 1814, the least known and studied period 
of the old regime’s finances. In order to estimate transfers from the 
colonies in this period, we combine two issues: (1) American remittances 
sent to Europe on neutral ships between 1805 and 1808; (2) remittances 
sent directly to Cádiz between 1808 and 1812. 
This may help to correct a common impression in the literature 
dealing with the period which suggests that, after 1804, American 
contributions to Spain’s royal treasury declined to relatively insignificant 
levels.10 Our argument is that, on the contrary, during those years the 
Spanish American colonies contributed a significant volume of fiscal 
                                                          
9 Barbier (1983) points out that until 1783 the income from rights on American products 
arriving in Cádiz was included under the heading of the Indias in the General Depositary but 
was subsequently recorded under "general income". 
10 The data of Cuenca (1981) and Merino (1987) are especially fragile for the period 1808-
1814, while Comín (1990) does not provide fiscal information for the period 1808-1814. Josep 
Fontana (1986), meanwhile, offers global estimates similar to the two sets of aggregated and 
disaggregated data presented in this study. 
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resources despite successive international wars. This situation was 
accentuated following the Napoleonic invasion, constituting one of the 
main fiscal and financial supports of both the Junta Central (1809) and 




2.   SILVER REMITTANCES FROM AMERICAN TREASURIES TO 
SPAIN IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 18TH CENTURY 
During the second half of the 18th century, American fiscal transfers 
to the peninsula can be described in terms of two cycles. Between 1763 
and 1783, official remittances of the royal colonial treasury reached an 
annual average of 3.5 million pesos, being subject to strong fluctuations 
due to the wars in which the Spanish Crown was involved, both in Europe 
and in America. 
A second cycle occurred between 1784 and 1804 when there was an 
extraordinary increase in the absolute level of remittances received by the 
royal treasury offices in Spain. In the quarter century between 1780 and 
1805, American treasuries transferred an average of slightly above 5.4 
million pesos in cash a year to Spain. However, the tax benefits obtained 
from the increase in official remittances of American tobacco and the 
increase in general income derived from American trade should be added 
to this figure and this gives us an average of 8.9 million pesos as the 
annual revenue received from the colonies by the metropolitan general 
treasury in this period. 
The change in the origin of American fiscal funds should also be 
noted. Before 1784, Peru contributed a proportion equal to or greater than 
that of New Spain, but from then until the end of the colonial regime, 
Bourbon Mexico clearly became the financial jewel in the empire’s 
crown. (See Table 3.) In fact, in the last decade of the 18th century, the 
royal treasury of New Spain exported nearly five million pesos of fiscal 
receipts annually to the metropolis, the highest figure in colonial history.11 
The fact that certain colonies made larger fiscal transfers to the 
metropolis than others (at different times) raises a series of questions that 
have hardly been explored in the literature on imperial finances.12 As 
early as 1773 and until 1787, the viceroyalty of New Spain alone provided 
slightly more than 50% of the total of the American fiscal remittances; but 
                                                          
11 See Marichal and Souto (1994). 
12 The last chapter of Klein (1995) entitled "The great turnaround: the rise of Mexico and the 
decline of Peru in the colonial empire of Spanish America, 1608-1808" is an exception. 
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from 1788 to 1810 this figure soared, reaching approximately 75% of the 
total amount sent from the colonies to the metropolis.13 (See Table 3) 
 
TABLE 1 
Ordinary Income of the Spanish Royal Treasury and Remittances from Indias,  
1763-1807 (in thousands of reales de vellon) 
Years 
           
Provincials 
        Salt   
        mines       Tobacco        General 
    Ecclesiastical     
     income 
    Other   
     income        Indias 
         Total      
       ordinary  
        income 
         
1763 79,380 23,523 70,612 39,766 29,640 173,933 58,056 474,910 
1764 68,426 21,601 62,245 51,063 34,509 158,789 55,923 452,556 
1765 65,651 23,170 72,358 45,808 42,598 152,868 88,075 490,528 
1766 68,905 22,784 65,488 42,431 30,871 146,976 63,635 441,090 
1767 62,735 21,504 72,590 47,315 30,009 150,203 78,162 462,518 
1768 66,114 24,837 65,997 52,374 30,478 142,540 65,593 447,933 
1769 70,733 24,052 70,326 44,239 27,518 154,988 17,839 409,695 
1770 73,220 22,608 74,539 46,041 32,741 100,998 109,487 459,634 
1771 59,970 23,983 77,177 53,514 30,598 122,066 12,241 379,549 
1772 71,290 24,987 80,108 52,889 31,868 88,326 94,688 444,156 
1773 66,773 24,432 81,247 52,019 32,296 94,286 32,055 383,108 
1774 70,376 26,968 80,699 56,277 32,507 85,875 134,503 487,205 
1775 74,156 24,188 79,881 45,890 32,422 91,940 67,125 415,602 
1776 75,182 23,468 81,409 52,308 23,444 105,941 80,021 441,773 
1777 75,311 22,300 85,126 45,148 28,247 133,918 21,659 411,709 
1778 72,481 29,441 111,483 59,115 31,570 104,707 123,970 532,767 
1779 76,981 23,944 107,882 64,031 32,388 122,074 10,349 437,649 
1780 87,620 21,905 82,691 41,103 27,373 446,084 5,329 712,105 
1781 108,861 33,513 86,975 35,864 33,916 328,846 33,346 661,321 
1782 107,686 29,677 84,031 55,750 28,493 404,248 4,826 714,711 
1783 117,358 25,999 87,478 73,127 29,126 170,536 18,883 522,507 
1784 79,189 29,738 89,574 126,415 28,465 162,339 79,903 595,623 
1785 83,776 31,960 87,154 180,951 32,001 132,171 43,942 591,955 
1786 75,385 27,716 80,812 159,144 31,902 144,627 77,143 596,729 
1787 89,975 33,395 85,045 134,624 34,185 155,839 67,217 600,280 
1788 108,000 25,519 89,994 154,359 32,680 161,819 85,152 657,523 
1789 85,738 33,199 77,724 149,384 32,837 119,202 24,767 522,851 
1790 110,648 32,673 76,710 147,760 33,952 114,220 100,768 616,731 
                                                          
13 Concentrated information for remittances from other viceroyalties or captaincies general 
does not exist. It is, however, possible to make some estimates. For example, Bonnett Vélez 
(1995), p. 35, indicates that remittances from New Granada averaged around 200,000 pesos in 
the 1790s, rising to 1.5 million pesos in 1802. 
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    Table 1 (cont.)    
Years 
           
Provincials 
        Salt   
        mines       Tobacco        General 
    
Ecclesiastical     
     income 
    Other   
     income        Indias 
         Total      
       ordinary  
        income 
         
1791 102,627 28,591 79,113 162,130 31,704 110,124 161,269 675,558 
1792 99,288 24,129 68,295 165,908 31,427 110,228 130,331 629,606 
1793 115,149 36,645 58,644 119,391 33,004 110,558 141,728 615,119 
1794 114,887 30,955 61,871 122,997 36,531 142,075 195,718 705,034 
1795 126,149 44,649 83,287 112,624 40,397 188,258 138,764 734,128 
1796 128,035 48,707 69,805 193,148 44,652 214,126 236,896 935,369 
1798 124,136 45,048 67,632 47,773 53,560 178,331 131,800 648,280 
1799 129,399 55,742 64,335 59,233 39,814 111,609 90,861 550,993 
1800 108,447 51,589 84,254 56,069 25,087 111,130 1,326 437,902 
1801 122,942 56,324 80,544 56,922 26,372 89,515 341 432,960 
1802 111,410 47,613 59,924 160,908 24,898 81,064 350,195 836,012 
1806 147,072 63,308 107,482 67,330 25,428 88,888 40,820 540,328 
1807    158,354 79,584 145,074 64,252 26,116 79,165 2,751 555,296 
Total 4,378,447 1,579,209 3,688,472 3,893,472 1,467,271 6,765,272 3,794,298 25,566,157 
 
Sources: Jose Patricio Merino, Las cuentas de la Administración Central española, 1750-1820. 
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TABLE 2 
General Treasury of Spain, 1763-1811. Share of Spanish America in total ordinary 





       Income from  
       Indias (*)       %  Total 
     
1763 416,854 58,056 12.22 474,910 
1764 396,633 55,923 12.36 452,556 
1765 402,453 88,075 17.96 490,528 
1766 377,455 63,635 14.43 441,090 
1767 384,356 78,162 16.90 462,518 
1768 382,340 65,593 14.64 447,933 
1769 391,856 17,839 4.35 409,695 
1770 350,147 109,487 23.82 459,634 
1771 367,308 12,241 3.23 379,549 
1772 349,468 94,688 21.32 444,156 
1773 351,053 32,055 8.37 383,108 
1774 352,702 134,503 27.61 487 .205 
1775 348,477 67,125 16.15 415,602 
1776 361,752 80,021 18.11 441,773 
1777 390,050 21,659 5.26 411,709 
1778 408,797 123,970 23.27 532,767 
1779 427,300 10,349 2.36 437,649 
1780 706,776 5,329 0.75 712,105 
1781 627,975 33,346 5.04 661,321 
1782 709,885 4,826 0.68 714,711 
1783 459,816 62.691 12.00 522,507 
1784 455,402 140,221 23.54 595 .623 
1785 471,939 120,016 20.27 591,955 
1786 451,640 145,089 24.31 596,729 
1787 471,415 128,865 21.47 600,280 
1788 503,565 153,958 23.41 657,523 
1789 433,838 89,013 17.02 522,851 
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  Income from  
       Indias (*)       %  Total 
     
1791 445,872 229,686 34.00 675,558 
1794 456,949 248,085 35.19 705,034 
1795 540,755 193,373 26.34 734,128 
1796 623,077 312,292 33.39 935,369 
1797 618,979 57,613 8.52 676,592 
1798 485,240 163,040 25.15 648,280 
1799 426,278 124,715 22.63 550,993 
1800 398,692 39,210 8.95 437,902 
1801 395,406 37,554 8.67 432,960 
1802 422,564 413,448 49.45 836,012 
1803 494,297 307,220 38.33 801,517 
1804 629,111 274,276 30.36 903,387 
1805 429,174 94,184 18 523,358 
1806 452,438 87,890 16.27 540,328 
1807 497,001 58,295 10.5 555,296 
1808 n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 
1809 126,577 295,000 69.98 421,577 
1810 150,500 250,500 62.47 401,000 
1811 260,000 73,000 21.92 333,000 
 
n.i. no information 
(*) Between 1783 and 1807, Indias include both the fiscal transfers from the American treasuries to 
the metropolis plus 25% of the income from Tobacco and 30% of the General Income in the 
Peninsula. 
Sources: José Patricio Merino, Las cuentas de la Administración Central Española, and José Canga 
Argüelles, Diccionario de Hacienda. 
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TABLE 3 
General Treasury of Spain, 1763 -1811. New Spain's participation in the Remittances 
of Spanish America to the Metropolis (in thousands of reales de vellon) * 
  New Spain % Total Spanish America 
1763-1767 42,969 12.50  34,851 
1768-1772 67,106 22.38 299,848 
1773-1777 186,367 55.57 335,363 
1778-1782 110,935 62.39 177,820 
1783-1787 127,444 44.39 287,088 
1788-1792 408,873 81.40 502,287 
1793-1797 472,382 65.11 725,466 
1798-1802 378,617 65.90 574,523 
1803-1807 360,000 57 .59 625,104 
                   1808-1801 (**) 556,638 90.00 61,500 
Subtotal        1763-1811    2,711,330 60.39            4,489,850 
 
(*) The real de vellon is calculated at a rate of 20 reales = 1 silver peso. 
(**) Four years in this case. 
Sources: José Patricio Merino, Las cuentas de la Administración Central española; Herbert Klein and 
John TePaske, Ingresos y egresos de la Real Hacienda de Nueva España, and José Canga Argüelles, 




3.   AMERICAN FISCAL REMITTANCES TO THE METROPOLIS, 
1760-1804: HOW IMPORTANT WERE THEY FOR SPAIN’S 
FINANCES? 
We have argued that the existing data on official remittances from 
Spain’s American colonies show an increasing trend, peaking around 
1790-1810. The subject deserves more in-depth study, but for the 
purposes of this essay, which focuses specifically on the logic and 
dynamics of imperial taxation, the key question is: what percentage of the 
total income of the metropolitan general treasury did remittances from the 
American treasuries contribute? 
Most of the authors who have investigated this area -from Humboldt 
onwards- have argued that American contributions to the metropolis were 
substantial, but that their weight should not be exaggerated. It is generally 
stated that American remittances, at best, could have reached around 20% 
of the total fiscal revenues of the metropolis during the second half of the 
18th century. However, in general such studies, except for two essays by 
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Jacques Barbier and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, lacked a relatively 
sound statistical basis.14 It is important, then, to analyze José Patricio 
Merino’s recent publication of the annual series of income and expenses 
of the central administration in Spain, which provides more precise data 
on the income of the general treasury and therefore facilitates the 
calculation of an estimate of the volume and evolution of the total 
remittances under the heading of the Indias as a percentage of total 
peninsular ordinary income, at least until 1805.15 To complete the series 
for the years following 1805-1811, we revised and updated the figures. 
(See Tables 1 and 2 covering the years 1763 to 1811.)  
The trends indicated are quite clear. They show a sustained growth - in 
absolute terms - of American remittances and especially of those from 
New Spain to the metropolis, although important fluctuations in their 
relative importance for the metropolitan treasury can also be appreciated 
throughout this last phase of the imperial government. 
In general terms, our estimates indicate that for the period from 1763 
to 1783, as an annual average, American transfers represented less than 
15% of the ordinary income of the general treasury of the metropolis. This 
means that for this specific period we need to revise downwards the 
calculations in the historiography which maintain that the Indias 
represented approximately 20% of the ordinary income of the Spanish 
government. In contrast, for the period from 1784 to 1807, the data 
presented here indicate that the annual average of American transfers 
reached almost 25% of the peninsula's ordinary income, becoming the 
most important single source of fiscal revenue of the metropolis during 
this period. This, obviously, means that an upward revision of the figures 
of most studies of Spanish finances during this last stage of the empire is 
required.  
However, in order to delve more deeply, it is necessary to define both 
the concept of "ordinary income" more precisely and what exactly is 
meant by the fiscal register of Indias. We should bear in mind that in 
order to analyze the evolution of the finances of the metropolis, it is 
necessary to distinguish between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" income 
of the general treasury of Madrid. Ordinary income can be defined 
essentially as tax revenue of different types, while extraordinary income 
                                                          
14 Barbier states: “On the average the Depositaría's entire income (Indias and rentas) 
represented 19.3% of General Treasury expenditure in 1760-65; 21.4% in 1766-1778; and 20% 
in 1779-1789”. Barbier (1980b), p. 346. Prados de la Escosura (1989) uses data from Merino 
but does not take into account the errors in these series from 1790 onwards. Humboldt's 
"calculations" are found in "Book VI" of his Political Essay. 
15 Merino (1987); for other estimates which are not always concordant, see Cuenca (1981) and 
Barbier and Klein (1981 and 1986). 
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included that from different types of debt (short or long term) as well as a 
series of accounting categories sometimes difficult to disaggregate.16 
Why, then, is it important to separate the study of ordinary income from 
that of extraordinary income? 
The explanation is to be found in one of the basic principles of 
taxation; ordinary income, as is well known, constitutes a direct and 
definitive transfer from the taxpaying public to the state (obtained through 
taxes, fiscal monopolies or other various sources) while extraordinary 
income normally comes from debt instruments issued by the tax authority 
that have to be returned to the holders at fixed terms and with interest. 
Ordinary income, therefore, constitutes a net contribution - an "asset" - at 
the disposal of the tax authorities, while extraordinary income becomes a 
debt - a "liability" – with more or less weight to be repaid by the public 
purse in the short and long term. 
So, how should the income of the royal treasury under the heading of 
the Indias be classified? We consider it as a category to be included under 
the general heading of "ordinary" income given that it constituted net 
income that did not have to be returned. In general, until 1790, American 
remittances represented the simple transfer of tax surpluses from the 
colonies to the metropolis and, therefore, they should be considered as 
simply another source of revenue for the general treasury. In other words, 
they were fresh tax resources that did not imply the accumulation of any 
debt for the Spanish authorities.17 
If we look at the series in Table 1, we observe that the Indias averaged 
approximately 20% of the ordinary annual revenue of the general treasury 
for the period between 1763 and 1807.18 This figure, however, 
underestimates the total American tax contribution. It should be noted that 
to calculate the total tax benefit that the metropolis obtained from its 
                                                          
16 The two largest accounting items through the 1790s were "extraordinary items" (efectos 
extraordinarios) and "inventories". The former consisted mainly of all the loans and "local 
taxes" (arbitrios) used to obtain medium-term funding. The latter included both the surpluses 
from the previous year yet to be spent and the sum resulting from all the promissory notes 
issued by the government or army not yet covered in cash. The increase recorded under this 
heading of "inventories" from 1793 to 1798 is cumulative and corresponds closely to the 
heading of "letters of payment passed to the next treasury" (cartas de pago de tesorería 
sucesiva) that appears next to "expenses" in the royal treasury’s accounts. See Merino (1987). 
17 The item "Indias" consisted mainly of remittances of fiscal surpluses from the American 
treasuries to Spain; as from 1793, numerous loans and donations gathered in the Americas 
were added to this item. Although these became "public debt", this sum was recorded as a 
liability for the respective American treasuries, which had to mortgage some sources of fiscal 
revenue to be able to make the required service and amortization payments, rather than for the 
treasury of the metropolis.  
18 This matches the previously mentioned estimates of Barbier (1980), p. 346. 
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empire as from 1783, additional sums would need to be added. There 
should include the part of the general income that corresponded to the 
taxes on the American portion of foreign trade, as analyzed by Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura in a recent paper. But a significant part of the 
profits of the state tobacco monopoly in the metropolis (on account of the 
remittances of raw tobacco from Cuba) should also be added in; it should 
be noted that Prados de la Escosura does not include these in his 
calculations.19 
We employed the following method, always based on Merino’s (1987) 
data, to calculate "American" income remitted to Spain. Until 1783 we 
used the income figures for the General Depositary of the Indias recorded 
by Merino, adding only 25% of the income from raw tobacco in the 
metropolis. After 1783 we also add 30% of "general income", since this 
figure represents a minimum value for the proportion of customs income 
obtained from trade with America.20 Adding a percentage (30%) of 
"general income" (collected in the peninsula on trade with America) to the 
figure for the Indias heading does not seem to be controversial according 
to Prados de la Escosura (who calculates that transactions with the 
American colonies made up 35% of total Spanish trade between 1783 and 
1810).21 
On the other hand, the inclusion of a percentage of the enormous value 
of remittances of raw tobacco from Cuba to Spain may seem more 
debatable. It should, however, be emphasized that said remittances in kind 
were very significant even though they were not included in the estimates 
published by the officials of the royal treasury under the heading of 
remittances from the Indias. Our reasoning is as follows: we can estimate 
that part of the value of the production of the tobacco monopoly in Spain 
(at least 25%, in our opinion) came directly from the huge quantity of raw 
tobacco shipped from the tobacco monopoly in Cuba, given that the bulk 
of the raw material used in the Spanish factories to make cigarettes (as 
well as snuff) came from the Spanish Caribbean as a net fiscal transfer, 
although in kind.22 It seems reasonable, therefore, to argue that at least 
                                                          
19 For the estimate including general income, see Prados de la Escosura (1993). There are no 
published studies for tobacco, except the very old estimates of De la Sagra (1831). 
20 See Barbier for the discussion of the characteristics of the income of the Depositary General 
of the Indias until 1783. 
21 Prados of Escosura (1993), p. 270 and pp. 287-291. We have preferred a lower figure to 
avoid possible overestimations. 
22 The compiler of encyclopedias, Ramón de la Sagra (1831), calculated that Cuba had 
provided a tax subsidy of about 200 million pesos (in tobacco) to the metropolis between 1760 
and 1810. Deans Smith (1992), p. 61, points out that, between 1778 and 1796, tobacco leaf to 
the value of 72.8 million pesos was imported to the port of Cádiz from the royal monopoly 
(estanco) in Cuba. 
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25% of the tobacco income recorded by Madrid’s general treasury can be 
considered as derived directly from the colonies.23 
 
FIGURE 1 
General Treasury of Spain, 1763-1811 Ordinary Income of the Peninsula and Indias. 
 
Sources: table 2 
 
The revised income trends for the Indias (Figures 1 and 2) lead to 
clear conclusions: American remittances are probably the most important 
single category of ordinary income of the metropolitan treasury for almost 
half a century and, as from 1784, they constituted a determining factor in 








                                                          
23 The figures of Fisher (1985), pp. 68-70 clearly exaggerate the value of the tobacco imported 
into Spain from the colonies on behalf of the Crown. A more detailed investigation based on 
the information regarding tobacco in the General Archive of the Indias is required. 
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FIGURE 2 
Spanish General Treasury, 1763-1811 Ordinary and Extraordinary Income 
 
Note: Ordinary income include income from Indias. 




General Treasury of Spain, 1763-1811. Income from Indias and New Spain 
 
(*) Figures cover October 1808 to February 1811. 
Sources: table 2  
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4.   DEFICIT AND DEBT UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF CARLOS 
IV: AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS 
In a recent study, Pedro Tedde argued that Spain’s economic 
administration under Carlos III (1759-1788) should be reassessed, given 
that there were no major budgetary imbalances.24 We would add that the 
fact that the monarchy was able to avoid deficits, especially during the 
war of 1779-1783 against Great Britain, was clearly thanks to the colonial 
contributions to the armed forces in the Caribbean.25 A real and unsolved 
mystery, however, surrounds why Spanish finances sank so systematically 
and definitively after 1790. The large deficits that Spain’s treasury began 
to experience from 1792 onwards affected the colonies directly given that 
the demands for fiscal resources by the Crown surpassed their ability to 
obtain the necessary resources through taxes alone, therefore requiring the 
ratification of numerous donations and loans. From 1792 onward, 
therefore, American remittances became much more complex as they 
increased in volume. 
It is particularly important therefore to analyze the divergence 
between ever-increasing expenses and the relative stagnation of ordinary 
income in the metropolis. These deficits experienced by the Spanish 
administration were the true causes of the weakening process that the 
monarchy's finances suffered which forced the American colonies to 
gather and transfer an ever-increasing amount of their own resources. But 
we must ask: what were the causes of the deficits experienced in the 
metropolis in the 1790s? The fact that growth in expenditure outran that 
of income was a process caused by a succession of international wars. 
Following the war against the French Convention in 1793-95, the military 
and financial expenses of the government in Spain began to exceed all the 
expectations of the Crown’s ministers.26 The subsequent outbreak of the 
first naval war with England (1796-1802) meant that the situation became 
almost impossible to control, as deficits accumulated year after year. 
The gap between income and expenses grew every year, leading to a 
fiscal and financial situation became increasingly problematic given that 
possible taxes increases in the metropolis were very limited between 1792 
and 1798. The government attempted to bridge the huge gap with 
voluntary and forced loans, by issuing vales reales (public debt 
                                                          
24 Tedde (1988 and 1989) also argues that important financial reforms were introduced in this 
period, such as the establishment of the Banco de San Carlos and the ratification of a modern 
public debt policy. 
25 See Marichal and Souto (1994). 
26 An excellent synthesis of the forecasts (which were, in general, erroneous) of the ministers 
of finance in the 1790s can be found in Canga Argüelles (1834), who transcribes the treasury 
reports of the period. 
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securities), with foreign debt, by paying many bills with promissory notes 
(floating debt), with the establishment of donations, ecclesiastical 
subsidies, and the introduction of a rigorous tax collection policy in the 
Americas, requiring that any surpluses, such as those of New Spain, be 
transferred immediately to the metropolis.27 
According to the calculations of the tax expert José Canga Argüelles, 
the expenses of the war with France between 1793 and 1795 absorbed 
4,741 million reales, of which only 40% could be covered with taxes, 
leaving an initial deficit of almost 60%. This deficit was covered with 511 
million reales in donations and loans, 380 million in supplements from 
the Banco de San Carlos and successful merchants in Madrid, 476 million 
from America and 311 million reales raised from tax increases.28 
However, there was still a shortfall of a billion reales that could only be 
covered by the sale of vales reales or by floating debt in the form of the 
delivery of promissory notes to government creditors, including its own 
employees and soldiers. 
The first naval war with England (1796-1802) brought more huge 
costs which reached more than four billion reales between 1796 and 1798 
alone. This led to a deficit of approximately 1,780 million reales 
according to Canga Argüelles.29 (See Table 4.) The issue of vales reales 
to the value of almost 2,500 million reales (at an average of 60% of their 
nominal value), coupled with the placement of approximately 1 billion 
reales in promissory notes (floating debt) were the instruments that finally 
made it possible to cover these large deficits, as confirmed by the data 
collected by Merino from the annual accounts of the Madrid general 
treasury. 
Herbert Klein and Jacques Barbier analyzed this situation and argue 
that the extraordinary increase in the expenses of the army and the navy 
was the root of the deficits of the Spanish royal treasury.30 However, it is 
also necessary to add a series of financial expenses that have been studied 
by other authors. We refer, for example, to the growing cost of servicing 
the vales reales; they were issued less and less by the royal treasury due to 
the fall in their value during the war years. Secondly, the high cost of 
servicing the foreign debt in the Netherlands, which had to be paid in 
American silver, should also be considered. Thirdly, there was the cost of 
                                                          
27 See proposals from Minister of Finance Francisco de Saavedra, in 1798, who believed that 
the only option for the metropolitan treasury was to seek funds from America. Canga 
Argüelles (18 33-34), p. 167. 
28 Canga Argüelles (1833-34), pp. 93-94, includes detailed tables of their estimates. 
29 Ibid. pp. 93-94. 
30 Barbier and Klein (1981), pp. 315-339. 
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paying numerous creditors in the metropolis itself, who insisted on the 
return of sums borrowed or advanced in the short term; significant among 
such creditors was the Banco de San Carlos which, in effect, was brought 
to the brink of bankruptcy due to the numerous loans it was forced to 
grant to the government.31 
The establishment of the Consolidación de Vales Reales in the 
metropolis from 1798 made it possible to liquidate a substantial part of the 
floating debt and cover deficits in subsequent years.32 The situation of the 
treasury, however, remained critical. Hence, the renewal of shipments of 
large quantities of American silver in 1802 - after the signing of the 
Treaty of Amiens - was essential to avoid bankruptcy. The sums that 
arrived in the short space of two years from the colonies - and especially 
from New Spain - were surprisingly large, amounting to more than 800 
million reales, equivalent to more than 40% of the ordinary metropolitan 
tax revenues in the years 1802-04.33 
Transfers of American silver on Spanish warships were suspended 
after the renewal of the war with Great Britain at the end of 1804. For this 
reason, the general treasury statistics do not reflect income from the 
American treasuries for the years 1805-1808. However, a review of 
neutral trade shipments makes it clear that the colonies continued to make 
large payments to the Spanish treasury. This subject has been investigated 
in some detail in studies carried out by Dutch, North American, and 
French historians but are scarcely cited in Spanish economic 
historiography.34 These studies show that from 1805 the Crown’s tax 
officials - and more specifically Manuel Espinosa, director of the Caja de 
Consolidación signed contracts with two large international trading 
groups which guaranteed the transfer of significant amounts from 
America in the fateful years after the defeat of the Spanish-French navy at 
Trafalgar (October, 1805). 
The first contract was signed with the banker and supplier of the 
French navy, Gabriel Ouvrard, who obtained payment orders (libranzas) 
worth ten million silver pesos (equivalent to ten million dollars) payable 
in New Spain with the objective of settling debts with France derived 
                                                          
31 The fundamental research on the Banco de San Carlos is that of Tedde (1988), but Artola 
(1986) is more explicit in highlighting the virtual bankruptcy of this financial institution as a 
result of the wars. 
32 This is indicated in the studies of Richard Herr (1971), who calculated that the total value of 
disposals (enajenaciones) in the metropolis reached more than 1.23 million reales between 
1798 and 1808. 
33 See figures in Merino (1987). 
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from the subsidy treaty signed by Carlos IV and Napoleon in October, 
1803. These transfers were made with the help of the Hope financial 
house in The Netherlands and Baring Brothers in England in one of the 
most complex episodes in the financial history of the Napoleonic period. 
In this way the American colonies covered a large part of the Spanish 
Crown’s international debts.35 
At the same time other remittances were sent from the Mexican 
treasuries via a contract signed with the Spanish-English consortium of 
Gordon, Murphy and Company. This group of audacious and 
cosmopolitan traders was responsible for the shipment (in neutral vessels 
which set sail from Europe) of a series of fiscal resources derived from 
taxes and monopolies in New Spain – including the sale of mercury for 
the silver mines, paper for the tobacco monopoly and other royal 
monopolies (estancos). In fact, this consortium collected at least ten 
million pesos from the colonial treasuries between 1806 and 1808 , which 
were shipped across the Atlantic and subsequently used to cover 
additional financial commitments of the Spanish crown in Europe.36 
In the final years of the reign of Carlos IV, the American colonies 
continued to provide significant fiscal revenues to the Spanish monarchy, 
even though the Spanish navy was at a total standstill after the disastrous 
naval battle of Trafalgar. From May 1808 – thanks to the new agreement 
between Great Britain and the liberal government of the Spanish patriots 
at the port of Cadiz who opposed and held off Napoleon- the ships of the 
Spanish Navy were able again to set sail for the Americas in search of 
sources of hard cash, securing a further increase in colonial transfers to 
the metropolis, including both fiscal and private remittances. 
 
 
5.  THE NAPOLEONIC INVASION AND AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR 
THE CENTRAL BOARD AND THE CORTES DE CÁDIZ  
The surprisingly high amount of remittances from America to the 
metropolis handled by the royal treasury between October 1808 and 
February 1811 should be noted; the figure was close to 30 million silver 
pesos, of which 24 million came from New Spain. (See Table 3.) This 
situation plays a crucial part in explaining both the evolution of finances 
in Mexico in the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the wars of 
independence, as well as the evolution of Spanish finances in the initial 
period of the wars against Napoleon. 
                                                          
35 Ibid. for the details. See also Marichal (1990). 
36 For details of the Gordon/Murphy operations, see Jímenez Cudinach (1991) and Marichal 
(1996). 
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How important were these contributions in relation to the total income 
received by the royal treasury in Spain, firstly in the case of the Regency 
of 1808/1809 and, subsequently (1810-1812), for the administration of the 
liberal government of the Cortes de Cádiz? Given the fragmentation of 
the Spanish government’s accounts in this period, it is risky to put 
forward a precise calculation; but at least we can suggest some rough 
estimates from a review of various sources that provide general indicators 
of the fiscal revenues generated locally and those received from the 
Americas.37 First, however, it is necessary to look in some detail at the 
evolution of the finances of the various government bodies and military 
forces of the Spanish resistance. Somewhat surprisingly, this area has only 
been addressed by a small, pioneering group made up of Josep Fontana, 
Ramón Garrabou and Timothy Anna, although the first two authors do not 
provide adequate estimates of Spanish American remittances.38 
To begin with, it is important to keep in mind the profound fiscal and 
financial crisis in Spain after the Napoleonic invasion. In fact, following 
foreign occupation, the Spanish population suffered a double taxation: one 
imposed by the invading French army and the other – much less 
systematic- ratified in different regions of the peninsula by patriotic 
governments and armies.39 The French administration attempted to 
introduce some order by appropriating the old tax system in the territories 
under its control. However, the success of this system was far from total, 
not only because of the greed of the Napoleonic officials and troops, but 
also because the evolution of the war in the years 1808 and 1809 meant 
that neither side enjoyed a clear control of the whole of the territory of 
Spain, with both sides experiencing a series of advances and setbacks.40 
The financial measures adopted by the organizations of the Spanish 
resistance that had to deal with the consequences of the collapse of the old 
tax administration were not very considerable but should not be ignored. 
41 Following the clashes between French troops and patriotic Spaniards on 
May 2 in Madrid, the resistance movement gained strength: autonomous 
                                                          
37 The few historical studies on the subject provide some data: for example, Fontana (1981 and 
1986), but they should be complemented by rather obscure contemporary sources, including 
Alcalá Galiana (1812), the reports of Canga Argüelles (1811, 1813, 1830, 1835) and a fairly 
diverse range of brochures which will be cited. 
38 Fontana (1981), Fontana and Garrabou (1986) and Anna (1986). 
39 The best preliminary analysis is provided by Fontana (1981 and 1986). 
40 It should be underlined that the system used by Napoleon to finance his armies -which 
consisted of "living off the land", appropriating livestock and cereals from the towns and farms 
where they camped- consisted fundamentally of plunder and was not conducive to an orderly 
system of taxation. See references in Fugier (1930) and Aftalion (1990). 
41 Fontana (1981) and Fontana and Garrabou (1986) provide important information on this 
subject, especially regarding the resistance in Catalonia. 
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provincial boards (juntas) began to be set up which soon received support 
from the British government in the form of direct cash subsidies as well as 
large amounts of military equipment, rifles, ammunition, and uniforms. 
The first agents of these Spanish juntas arrived in London in June 1808 
and negotiated a financial aid program with Prime Minister Canning. 
Most of the British subsidies went to the juntas of Asturias, La Coruña, 
León, Seville and Cádiz for a total amount close to 70 million reales 
between June 1808 and the beginning of 1809.42 The British government 
also sent a large quantity of rifles and ammunition to Spain; some well 
researched estimates indicate that around 160,000 muskets and guns were 
sent between August and November as well as clothing (of variable 
quality) for several tens of thousands of soldiers.43 
However, from early 1809, and for most of the next two years, English 
subsidies to Spain were much more limited, being restricted basically to 
some additional shipments of foodstuffs as well as arms and ammunition 
that were financed with bills of payment to be collected from Mexican 
treasuries.44 The fact of the matter was that from late 1809 onwards, the 
cash funds sent from England to help in the peninsular war were used 
almost entirely to support the British army in Portugal under the 
command of Wellington and to feed the population of Lisbon.45 
The Spanish patriot government at Cadiz as well as existing military 
forces resisting the French were forced to seek fresh sources of income. In 
most of the peninsula, the system that historian Josep Fontana aptly called 
that of "immediate taxation", based on the provision of supplies and 
voluntary or forced loans in the various regions where the war continued 
against the French, remained absolutely fundamental.46 Thus, in Galicia, 
Catalonia and Valencia, the war was not financed with external funds but 
                                                          
42 Canga Argüelles (1835), vol. 1, p. 149, and vol. 2, p. 304, indicates that the distribution was 
as follows: 18 million reales to the junta of Asturias, 20 million to that of Seville, 20 million to 
that of La Coruña and 10 million to that of León. See Sherwig (1969), p. 198, for data on the 
first series of subsidies paid between June and August 1808. 
43 The information is diverse: see Sherwig (1989), pp. 199-200, 222, 227, 249, 251, and Canga 
Argüelles (1835), vol. 1, doc. 57, pp. 253-257. 
44 The minister of finance in 1811, José Canga Argüelles, affirmed that payment orders 
(libranzas) for the value of 3 million pesos were sent with the Duke of Infantado to be paid in 
Veracruz to Admiral Cochrane: Canga Argüelles (1835), vol. 2, p. 307. Alamán (1849), vol. l, 
p. 301, mentioned the splendid reception given to Cochrane upon his arrival in Mexico in 1809 
due to his reputation as an admiral who had favoured the Spanish cause. 
45 Canga Argüelles (1835), 3 vols. passim, includes important comments and documents on 
this subject that can be compared with Sherwig (1958). It should be noted that the British 
contributions reached their highest levels in precisely the years when American remittances 
were scarce, that is, in 1808 and 1812. 
46 Fontana (1981). 
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rather by local taxation, organized by the provincial boards (juntas) and 
by military officials themselves. 
On the other hand, in Seville and Cádiz - seats of government, 
respectively, in 1809 and 1810-1812, the main source of fiscal revenue 
was provided by American remittances, at least until the beginning of 
1811. Analysis of the evolution of the finances of the Regency and its 
administrative body the Junta Central (with headquarters in Seville, ) as 
well as of the patriot armies in Andalusia and Extremadura during the 
year 1809, indicate the critical importance of American silver in the 
budgets of the patriotic government in this initial phase of the war. 
Vicente Alcalá Galiano, general treasurer of the Supreme Governing 
Board (Junta Suprema Gubernativa) in Seville, clarified some aspects of 
the fiscal situation in a document dated October, 1809 (in response to a 
representative of the junta of Valencia) in which he pointed out that the 
income of the junta were less than its military expenses, which was, in 
part, a consequence of the “dispersion of funds due to the federalization 
and fragmentation of power in the juntas ... “.47 Alcalá Galiana added 
significantly:48 
“Financial aid from America ... is the main source of funds that 
has been used to feed, maintain and increase our armies ... The 
total sum coming from those domains for the royal treasury 
amounts in all respects (between January and October 1809) to 
295,901,816 reales ...” 
According to the same report, the general treasury, the treasury of the 
Andalusian army and the tax offices of Cádiz recorded a total income of 
388,505,075 reales between January and October of 1809 (almost all for 
military expenses); part of this total came from approximately 50 million 
reales raised in taxes and the rest from a series of loans of the Cádiz 
Consulate made between April and November 1809 for the amount of 
44,380,000 reales, the majority to be repaid with money from America.49 
In summary, 75% of the total income of the Supreme Governing Board 
(Junta Suprema Gubernativa) in the first ten months of 1809 came from 
America. The funds received were used to support the modest civilian 
government structure in Seville, but above all they were used to support 
the armies of Andalusia and Extremadura. 
                                                          
47 Alcalá Galiana (Mexico, Reprinted in Casa de Arizpe, 1810), p. 6. 
48 Ibid. The figure was equivalent to 14.7 million silver pesos, at the exchange rate (20 reales = 
1 silver peso) used in 1811 by Minister of Finance, Canga Argüelles. 
49 Ibid. and Lucena Salmoral (1977), pp. 158-59. In fact, the Cádiz Consulate provided four 
loans during 1809: in April for 1 million pesos, in July 170,000 pesos, in October 40,000 pesos 
and in November 1 million pesos. 
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The political, military and financial situation of the patriotic resistance 
movement in the peninsula became even more delicate and complex in 
early 1810 with the entry and advance of fresh French troops and the 
collapse or progressive withdrawal of the Spanish troops. The main forces 
of the armies of Extremadura and Andalusia withdrew to the south and 
finally bunkered down in Cádiz. In turn, the members of the Junta Central 
- who also moved from Seville to Cádiz - agreed to disband in the light of 
the military defeats which had ended their legitimacy. Sovereign power, 
then, was transferred to the brand-new Regency Council (Consejo de la 
Regencia), made up of the Bishop of Orense, Pedro de Quevedo, the 
senior public officials Francisco de Saavedra, Francisco Xavier de 
Castaños and Antonio Escaño, and the clergyman Miguel Lardizábal y 
Uribe (in representation of America). 
Following a series of military defeats, the Regency clearly only had 
the resources it was able to gather in Cádiz itself. However, the situation 
in the port of Cádiz was better than the tens of thousands of political and 
military refugees who had arrived there in early 1810 would perhaps have 
imagined; in fact the new administration soon began to have access to 
considerable external cash resources, flowing in part from taxes on 
maritime trade but above all from remittances from the treasuries of 
America. For this reason, and thanks to its greater military security, it was 
in Cádiz that a true government and an army of a certain size was able to 
continue operating during the years of 1810 and 1811, while in the rest of 
Spain the Napoleonic occupation reached its peak. 
Given the initial weakness of the Regency, on January 28, 1810 the 
control of the royal treasury was handed over to the Junta de Cádiz, which 
managed most public money until the end of October of that year.50 The 
great merchants of Cádiz accepted these responsibilities with considerable 
enthusiasm, as illustrated by a proclamation to Spanish America 
published in early 1810 by the Junta de Cádiz in which it was stated: 
“Here is the essence of the war; here our union with the British nation has 
been further tightened ... ».51 
The Junta de Cádiz advised the Spanish Americans that the Regency 
had summoned them to participate in a National Congress (the Cortes de 
Cádiz whose sessions would commence in 1810) and stressed that this 
                                                          
50 The contract between the Regency and the Junta de Cádiz came into effect on March 31, 
1810. See the interesting document entitled "Royal approval and decree of HM on the 
regulation proposed by the Junta Superior de Cádiz, taking provisional control in its district of 
all taxes and their collection”, an 8-page document reprinted in Mexico in 1810; a copy is to be 
found in the Lafragua Collection, No. 182, National Library (Mexico). 
51 Junta Superior de Cádiz a la América Española (Cádiz, February 28, 1810), 10 pp. Doc. 
393, Lafragua Collection, National Library (Mexico). 
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political project should be facilitated by the fact that the mercantile 
community of Cádiz had links with virtually "all places in America", 
requesting all the financial support that the Spanish Americans could 
provide.52 
The Cádiz merchants occupied with treasury tasks were criticized in 
the Congress, although the minister of finance in 1811, José Canga 
Argüelles, did not hesitate to praise the work of the Junta de Cádiz in its 
management of public finances , considering it both scrupulous and of 
great use to the national cause:  
“Nothing was more straightforward for the ministry than the plan 
carried out by the Junta [of Cádiz]. It took care of all the 
obligations of the treasury in the district of Cádiz: it raised public 
funds, sought extraordinary resources, and the government was 
based on the careful work of distinguished citizens ...; the classes 
[employees] were catered for and the army and forces did not 
experience shortages ...” 53 
What, though, was the extent of the fiscal or financial resources available 
to the government in Cádiz in 1810? The Count of Toreno (Conde de 
Toreno), a distinguished member of the Cortes and an expert on the 
situation of public finances in those turbulent years, summarized the 
situation regarding income: 
“The income received by the Junta during that time [January-
October 1810] exceeded 351 million reales. Of this sum, about 
84 million came from local income; 17 million in donations and 
special taxes in the city; 54 million in loans and other items; and 
finally, more than 195 million from America.” 54 
Again, it is clear that more than half of the funds supporting the Spanish 
government proceeded from colonial remittances, reaching as much as 
56% of the total income collected by the Junta de Cádiz (January-October 
1810) while it controlled both the old tax office that received remittances 
from the Indias and the customs offices and other incomes. 
These figures match those compiled by the historian Timothy Anna, 
who adds that in the last two months of 1810 the income of the treasury 
offices totaled 56.7 million reales, "of which 30.5 million or 54% came 
                                                          
52 Ibid. In the same document it was stated: “Cádiz speaks to you, peoples of America, and 
trusts that its voice will be heard ... In which city, in which port, in what location however 
remote and hidden, is there not a correspondent, a relative or a friend of Cádiz? Oh, 
Americans! You have to defend the same rights, the same king, and fight the same 
injustices...” 
53 Canga Argüelles (1811), p 6. 
54 Toreno (1835), p. 306. 
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from America”.55 1811 was arguably the most difficult year of the war, 
due both to the various defeats suffered to the French armies and to the 
fall in government tax revenue in Cádiz.56 According to the Count of 
Toreno, total revenue barely reached 200 million reales, of which 71 
million came from America, especially from New Spain.57 Of this sum, 62 
million was brought on two English warships, the Bulwark and the 
Relentless, which had loaded sums for the royal treasury in the port of 
Veracruz in December 1810 and arrived in Cádiz in early 1811. 
In summary, a total of almost 30 million silver pesos (around 600 
million reales) in American tax remittances arrived in Cádiz between the 
end of 1808 and the beginning of 1811.58 Of this sum, arriving between 
December from 1808 and February 1811, approximately 80% came from 
New Spain, with minor contributions from Peru and various captaincies 
general. 
These figures allow us to qualify the interpretation of historian Josep 
Fontana, who makes the implicit suggestion that the American 
contribution in these years was substantial but not necessarily decisive.59 
                                                          
55 Anna (1986), p. 111. However, Anna himself states that "these sums do not include the large 
amounts from Great Britain"; the truth is that by then English financial aid was minimal, as 
pointed out by Canga Argüelles (1836), pp. 134-141. 
56 Fontana (1986), p. 81, states: "1811 was the worst year of the war." He adds that the 
treasury’s situation entered a major crisis but offers few details regarding contemporary fiscal 
developments. 
57 Anna (1986), pp. 116-117, quotes and comments on Toreno's estimates. They are largely in 
line with the calculations of Canga Argüelles (1813), minister of finance in 1811. Fontana and 
Garrabou (1986), p. 80, point out that in 1811, 83 million reales were received from America, 
73 million in fiscal remittances and 10 million in payment orders (libranzas) on banks in Lima. 
Fontana also calculates total government revenue in Cádiz in 1811 of approximately 200 
million reales. 
58 The total amount of fiscal remittances arriving in Cádiz from América between January 
1809 and the beginning of 1811, registered by Canga (1833-34), is 29,378,027 silver pesos 
(equivalent to 587,560,544 reales de vellón), while the total income of the general treasury in 
Seville and the tax administration in Cádiz recorded as coming from America was 591.4 
million reales. We believe that this correspondence indicates the reliability of the data. 
59 Fontana (1986), p. 97, states: "Over the five-year period of 1809-1814, the central treasury 
collected some 1,500 million reales, of which around 600 million, abundant until 1810 and 
rapidly declining after 1811, came from America..." However, the contrast between periods 
should be further stressed; between 1809 and 1811 total income was 1,000 million reales of 
which 60% came from America while between 1812 and 1814, in contrast and according to 
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It is clear from our analysis that during the three-year period 1809-1811, 
the central government's treasury (in Seville and Cádiz) would have 
collapsed had it not been for the numerous shipments of silver sent from 
the American treasuries and, especially, from Mexico. After 1812 this 
situation changed as remittances fell dramatically as a consequence of the 
wars that gathered force throughout Spanish America. What we are 
interested in highlighting, however, is the fact that in the first phase of the 
war against Napoleon, the Junta Central, the Regency and the Cortes de 
Cádiz (as well as the armies of Andalusia and Extremadura) depended 
primarily on the support of the colonies. Indeed, without this help, it is 
doubtful that the Spanish patriotic government and its forces could have 
survived the Napoleonic invasion. 
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